Sessões
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Próxima:
Problems with apparent reasons: The new attraction account Manuel S. F. 04 de Dezembro de 2025 Room Pedro Hispano - 11:00h Abstract: If, after ordering a glass of gin at a bar, I receive a glass that looks like gin, I am rational in believing that it is a glass of gin, even if it is in fact a glass of petrol (Williams 1981). Scenarios of this kind support the idea that epistemic rationality is not fundamentally about getting things right, but about responding in appropriate ways to how things appear. One promising way to articulate this insight is to explain epistemic rationality as responsiveness to apparent reasons. The most influential formulation of this notion is provided by the Attraction Account (Sylvan 2015). According to this view, p is an apparent reason to x (where p is a proposition and x a epistemic behaviour) iff p is an appearance for the subject, and she has the attraction to treat p as an objective reason to x, where this attraction manifests her reason-sensitive competence. The attraction account allows for a definition of epistemic rationality that is sufficiently demanding while still accommodating the agent’s epistemic position. This is because attractions that manifest reason-sensitive competence are independent of the agent’s idiosyncratic biases, while whether the relevant attraction manifests or not a reason-sensitive competence depends on the particular epistemic situation of the agent. Despite its promise, the Attraction Account faces two significant problems: the problem of treating and the problem of amalgamation. The former concerns Sylvan’s definition of what it is for an agent to treat p as an objective reason to x, and reveals a potential circularity in the definition as well as bad predictions about treating in particular scenarios. The latter problem arises from the fact that the account allows for situations in which agents ought to x in response to their apparent reasons while being unable to do so. In this talk, I present these two problems and offer a modified version of the Attraction Account that resolves them. Calendário |
Eventos
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Oficina dos Argumentos
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9 e 10 de Fevereiro 2014
Faculdade de Letras Universidade de Lisboa Sala 1.1 Organizado por Argument Clinic |
23 de Abril de 2025
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa Sala B112.B Organizado por Argument Clinic & Clepsydra |
