Sessões
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Próxima:
Not So Fast: What Epistemic Vigilance Can Say About Disagreement Pedro Amorim 20 de Maio de 2025 Room B112.E Abstract: We all disagree with each other at one time or another. But we cannot all be correct and still disagree. Maybe I am right, maybe you are right, maybe none of us is right. I have reasons to believe what I believe, you have reasons to believe what you believe. And we might’ve started with the same information, and both be equally intelligent. But at least one of us is wrong. What should we do? Should we both converge immediately on an answer by lowering our confidence? Should we both stick to our beliefs? Not so fast. Maybe disagreement is ill-understood as an individual issue, as a problem with which I should deal by myself. How should we understand it, then? I propose to start from an empirical fact about people, i.e., epistemic vigilance: what are the arguments for it? What is it? What does it involve? Next, we will frame disagreement in this: What does epistemic vigilance entail for disagreement? Is disagreement good, or bad? How should we deal with it? As we will see, we thrive epistemically in and with disagreement, but maybe not as we’d think. And disagreement might be the beginning of our collective path to the truth. Calendário |
Eventos
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Oficina dos Argumentos
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9 e 10 de Fevereiro 2014
Faculdade de Letras Universidade de Lisboa Sala 1.1 Organizado por Argument Clinic |
23 de Abril de 2025
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa Sala B112.B Organizado por Argument Clinic & Clepsydra |
